Thoughts on premise security (redux)

[richard childers / kg6hac]

(My first reply to this, sent over 90 minutes ago, was -not- propagated 
by the BayLISA mail server ... so I'm Cc:ing you directly, Michael. 
Apparently, -someone- found the potential for someone, somewhere, taking 
offense, was greater than your, and others', need for good information. 
Nice, eh?)

Reading this description of the secret call center, I cannot help but 
wonder:

- What protections are being taken against telephone taps?
- Have you secured your telephone switch and do you trust your 
provider?    [1]
- Have you secured the telecommunications cables leaving the building?
- Are you using fiber, where possible, instead of copper?
- How will you stop cleaning staff from installing listening devices?
- Have you tested the room and building for EMF transparency (Van Eck)?
- What's roof access like?
- What's beneath the building, in terms of navigable tunnels?
- Does your building share any walls with any other buildings?

And last but not least:

- What's to stop someone from kidnapping an employee (or cleaning person)?

You may want to consider a shuttle bus for your employees, too.

And, now that I think of it, a determined call center employee could 
still bring in a digital pocket tape recorder, or, even worse, a cell 
phone ... strip searches may be indicated ... or (a) metal detector(s), 
built into the door frame(s) of your mantrap.


[1] "The espionage operation reportedly includes employees of two 
companies that perform official wiretaps for the U. S. local, state and 
federal law enforcement: Comverse Infosys and Amdocs." (Complete story 
at http://www.rense.com/general19/spy.htm)


Food for thought.


-- richard

Richard Childers / Senior Engineer
Daemonized Networking Services
https://www.daemonized.com
(415) 759-5571

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